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INTRODUCTION
U.S. energy policy is shaped by concerns about energy security, the adequacy of supplies at reasonable and stable prices, and environmental impacts of energy production and use. Natural gas is a relatively clean fuel with lower emissions of greenhouse gases and conventional pollutants than coal and petroleum products. Moreover, newly advanced technologies for exploitation of domestic resources may make increased reliance on gas economic. In this changing resource picture four major areas of uncertainty will combine to determine gas production and use in the U.S.:
• The structure of greenhouse gas policies that may be put into effect in coming years: what form will emissions reductions policies take and how stringent will be the control levels? • The scale of domestic gas resources: with production from conventional resources falling, will sources such as tight gas, coal bed methane and shale gas allow U.S. production to continue to grow at stable prices?
• The technology mix in a carbon-constrained world, particularly in the electric sector: how will costs of competitors for natural gas respond to R&D and other efforts to stimulate cost reduction?
• The state of world gas production and trade: will we transition to a fully integrated world market like that for crude oil or will costs and other limits on intercontinental gas transport lead to the persistence of national and regional markets where forces to resolve interregional price differences are dampened?
These influences will interact to affect gas prices, use, domestic production, trade, and the need for further development of the natural gas distribution infrastructure in the U.S. They also will act in combination with broader forces affecting energy use including potential new uses for gas, such as compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles in transportation, domestic economic growth, and changes in world markets that affect the costs of fuels with which gas competes.
We explore these interactions as input to an MIT study, The Future of Natural Gas (MIT, 2010) applying first a global economic model that resolves key countries including the U.S. and includes details of natural gas resources, energy demand, and competing energy supply technology. Then, as a step toward understanding the implications for the adequacy of existing domestic gas infrastructure, we augment results from the global economic model simulations using a U.S. regional model that helps to identify how regional demand and supply may change in the future.
STUDY METHODS AND DATA

Global and U.S. Regional Models
Projections are made using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model and the U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model. Both are multi-region, multi-sector representations of the economy. The core results for the study are simulated using the EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005; Paltsev et al., 2010) . It is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that solves for the prices and quantities of interacting domestic and international markets for energy and non-energy goods as well as for equilibrium in factor markets. The USREP model is nearly identical in structure to EPPA, but represents the U.S. only, segmenting it into 12 single and multi-state regions (Rausch et al., 2009 (Rausch et al., , 2010 . The foreign sector is represented as export supply and import demand functions rather than a full representation of foreign economies, and interstate capital is mobile reflecting the ease of strongly connected capital markets within the U.S. whereas in the EPPA model international capital flows are restricted.
The way these models represent an economy is shown in Table 1 . They include sectors that produce and convert energy, industrial sectors that use energy and produce other goods and services, and households that consume goods and services (including energy) with the nonenergy production side of the economy aggregated into the five industrial sectors shown. These and other sectors have intermediate demands for all goods and services determined through an input-output structure. Final demand sectors include households, government, investment goods, and exports. Imports compete with domestic production to supply intermediate and final demands. Demand for fuels and electricity by households includes energy services such as space conditioning, lighting, etc., and a separate representation of demand for Household Transportation (the private automobile). Energy production and conversion sectors include coal, oil, and gas production, petroleum refining, and an extensive set of alternative generation technologies.
Of particular interest in analysis of natural gas are the Electric Generation and EnergyIntensive Products sectors and the potential penetration of natural gas into Household Transportation. Energy supply and conversion are modeled in enough detail to identify fuels and technologies with different CO 2 emissions and to represent both fossil and non-fossil technologies. The models include the non-CO 2 Kyoto gases (CH 4 , N 2 O, HFCs, PFCs and SF 6 ). All fossil energy resources are modeled in EPPA as graded resources whose cost of production rises continuously as they are depleted. In the fossil fuel production sectors, elasticities of substitution are set to generate elasticities of supply that fit the resource grades.
Production in any one period is limited by substitution and the value share of the resource that enters the energy sector production functions as a fixed factor. The regional resource value shares reflect estimated rents. Energy resources are subject to depletion based on physical production of fuel in the previous period (Paltsev et al., 2005) . We modify the approach for this study for natural gas supply by creating a two-stage production process. In stage 1 reserves are produced from resources, in stage 2 gas is produced from reserves. We apply this structure to four categories of gas resources: conventional, tight, shale, and coal-bed methane. Natural gas reserves expansion is driven by changes in gas prices, with reserve additions determined by elasticities benchmarked to the gas supply curves described in Section 2.2.
Sixteen geographical regions are represented in the EPPA model, as shown in Table 1 , including eight of the largest individual countries (USA, Canada, Japan, China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Mexico) and eight aggregate regions. The model computes the trade in all energy and non-energy goods among these regions so that results can be used to explore potential international trade in natural gas. The USREP model is based on a state-level data base, aggregated for this study into the six regions shown in the table.
The advantage of models of this type is their ability to explore ways that domestic and global energy markets will be influenced by the complex interaction of factors like those identified above. Most important for this exploration of the future of natural gas, the models provide a facility for integrating the combined effect of resource estimates, technology and policy issues.
Models of any type have limitations, particularly when applied over a multi-decade horizon.
Other input assumptions besides those mentioned above (e.g., about population and overall economic growth, and the ease of an economy's adjustment to price changes) also are subject to uncertainty over decades. There are details of market structure (e.g., various forms of gas contracts, political constraints on trade and technology choice) and of the behavior of individual industries that are beneath the level of aggregation of sectors within the models and reflected only implicitly in the parameters of aggregate production functions for the relatively coarsely resolved sectors. Also, because the models are solved on a five-year time step they cannot represent the effects of short-term price volatility. Therefore, these model results should be viewed not as predictions where confidence can be attributed to the absolute numbers but rather as illustrations of the directions and relative magnitudes of various influences on the role of gas, and as a basis for forming intuition about likely future developments in a greenhouse-gasconstrained market environment.
The Representation of Gas Resources
Among the important inputs to the EPPA model's sub-model of energy resource development and depletion that were re-evaluated for this study are estimates of the amount of resources and the costs of extracting them. Cost estimates for the different components of the gas supply functions represent the breakeven gas price required to bring that volume of gas to market using the ICF Hydrocarbon Supply Model (Vidas et al., 1993) and ICF World Gas Supply Model, which implement a bottom-up methodology starting at the field or play level. Breakeven gas price calculations account for co-product production on an energy equivalent basis. The components of the breakeven calculation differ depending on which category of gas resource is being analyzed. In the case of proved producing reserves, the breakeven price is simply the operating and maintenance (O&M) cost associated with maintaining production from existing wells. For proved, but not yet producing, reserves and for reserve growth, a discounted cash flow method was used to determine the required breakeven gas price to compensate for the capital spent to develop the resource, and to maintain it during its producing life. The calculation of breakeven prices for undiscovered conventional resources was executed in a manner that includes the cost of gas exploration activity in addition to the development and operating costs at the field level and took into account the size of the field, whether the field was onshore or offshore and what drilling depths were required. For unconventional resources in the U.S. and Canada a per-well methodology was used, where the well density, the per-well production profile and recovery rate were defined based on geological analysis of the play. To establish the breakeven gas price and the associated volume of gas for each well, the per-well production characteristics were combined with data on drilling and operating costs using a discounted cash flow methodology.
A rate of return of 10% was used, with U.S. The resulting representation of U.S. gas resource supply to which the EPPA model was benchmarked are illustrated by the curves in Figure 2 which show the quantity of gas that could be commercial at different extraction cost levels. Figure 2a shows the relative magnitudes of the mean estimate of U.S. resources, for current technology at 2004 costs, for the four types of deposits. Uncertainty in these estimates of resources and cost, for the total of the four categories, is shown in Figure 2b , where the Mean case is the horizontal sum of the resource types in Figure   2a . High and Low cases have been estimated to represent approximately an 80% confidence interval (i.e., a 10% chance of being above the High case estimate and a 10% chance of being less than the Low). 2 Similar uncertainty ranges hold for the gas resources of all other world regions, though for regions other than the U.S. all gas types are aggregated into a single resource curve. These are long run resource supply curves. It is important to note that in the economic model production in any period is subject to dynamic processes that add reserves from resources and deplete reserves and resources. These features slow development, allocating the available resource over time while creating resource rents. As a result the gas price in any period is higher than the extraction cost of the least cost resource available at that time. 3 Uncertainty in the similar supply functions for oil and coal is not considered in this study.
Other Influential Assumptions
Growth Assumption and Technology Costs
Several assumptions are important. U.S. economic growth is assumed to be 0. Table 2 . The first column contains technology costs imposed in the main body of the analysis, as documented in Appendix A with methodology described in Morris et al. (2010) , and the right-most column shows values to be employed in sensitivity tests to be explored later. Nuclear power, coal and gas generation with CO 2 capture and storage (CCS), and natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) plants are modeled as perfect substitutes for other conventional generation. Some estimates for coal or gas with CCS suggest even higher costs for early installations, but here we assume these costs apply to the n th plant, after experience is gained with the technology.
The costs for wind and solar imply that wind is near competitive in the base year and that solar costs three times that of conventional coal-fired electricity at that time. These intermittent renewables (wind and solar) are distinguished by scale. At low penetration levels they enter as imperfect substitutes for conventional electricity generation, and the estimates of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE 4 ) apply to early installations when renewables are at sites with access to the best quality resources and to the grid and storage or back-up is not required. Through the elasticity of substitution the model imposes a gradually increasing cost of production as their share increases, to be limited by the cost with backup.
These energy sector technologies, like others in the model, are subject to cost reductions over time through improvements in labor, energy, and (where applicable) land productivity. 
Representation of International Gas Markets
Assumptions about the structure of international gas markets also influence the prospects for U.S. natural gas, and we explore two ways they may evolve over coming decades. Current trade is concentrated within three regional markets, those circled in Figure 3 which highlights North
American trade (U.S., Canada and Mexico); trade among Europe, Russia and North Africa; and Asia/Middle East trade links among Japan, China, Indonesia, Australia, and other Asian countries. We represent current regional markets by modeling gas as an imperfect substitute among the regions (Armington trade structure). With the Armington trade, supply and demand changes in one region are not fully transmitted to other regions, and prices among regions can diverge. This formulation tends to preserve existing trade relationships and to limit expansion of trade to regions with which there is currently little or no trade. In the discussion to follow this case is referred to as a Regional Markets case and most of the analysis below assumes this trade pattern is sustained over the study period. However, if demand and supply changes in regions lead to wide price divergence it becomes more likely that trade patterns will change over time to take advantage of price differentials, and what could develop is a more globally-integrated market akin to the one that emerged in recent decades for oil. The gas market has been slower to develop than that for oil-due to the scale economies and lumpiness of investment in LNG and long-distance pipeline transport-but economic incentives for this evolution are present. To represent globally integrated natural gas market, where gas prices equalize among regions, except for differences in transportation costs between exporters and importers (Heckscher-Ohlin trade structure), we develop the Global Market scenario, which is explored in Section 5.
Scenarios considered
We consider a number of scenarios to investigate the implications for gas of different future energy and CO 2 policies and of uncertainty in other factors to which gas use and production is sensitive. These alternative assumptions include: These scenarios are simulated to 2050, and alternative cases consider the effects of the 80% confidence interval of estimated of gas resources, and the influence of alternative assumptions about the evolution of global gas markets. In addition, two other scenarios are explored:
• A Regulatory Climate Policy which gradually retires coal power plants and phases in a renewable electricity portfolio standard requiring renewable to supply 25% of electric generation.
• A Century-Scale Policy in which the simulation of a price-based policy is extended to 2100 with U.S. GHG emissions mitigation further tightened to 80% below the 2005 level. This case is used to explore the relationship between near term gas use and other energy measures and the ability to meet longer-run climate goals.
Because running all possible combinations of these alternative policies and sensitivities would create a prohibitively large number of possible scenarios, we investigate a selective set that highlight key determinants of the future role of natural gas.
In the discussion below we report all results in terms of constant 2005 dollars.
U.S. NATURAL GAS WITH NO ADDITIONAL CLIMATE POLICY
Even absent additional greenhouse gas mitigation the future role of natural gas in the U.S. will be influenced by the extent and cost of domestic gas resources, and the nature of the international gas market (explored in Section 5). Unless gas resources are at the Low end of the resource estimates in Figure 2 , domestic gas use and production are projected to grow substantially between now and 2050 ( Figure 4) . Under the Mean resource estimate U.S. gas production rises by roughly 40% between 2005 and 2050, and by a slightly higher 45% under the High estimate.
It is only under the Low resource outcome that resource availability substantially limits growth in domestic production and use. In that case, gas production and use plateau near 2030 and are in decline by 2050. U.S. imports remain roughly the same regardless of the magnitude of domestic resources, and a small quantity of exports (mainly to Mexico) is sustained. Details of this EPPA projection, and selected others for results below, all assuming Mean gas resources, are provided in Appendix B. 
EFFECTS OF GHG MITIGATION ON U.S. GAS PRODUCTION AND USE
In recent years attention has been devoted to the use of GHG emissions pricing, achieved by implementing a cap-and-trade system though often supplemented by regulation and subsidies.
Another possibility is a variety of other energy policies, perhaps motivated in large part by climate concerns, directed at specific technologies, especially those in electric generation. An incentive-based policy like a cap-and-trade system can vary from stringent to modest depending on what emissions cap or tax is set, how many offsets are allowed, and other possible costcontainment features. Similarly, there are endless variants of technology-based policies that might specify best available technology, create incentives for phase out of dirtier technologies, or require a certain percentage of clean technologies such as in a renewable energy standard. We consider the implications of one representation of each of these broad mitigation alternatives:
first via a price-based approach and then applying a regulatory alternative.
Mitigation Applying a Price-Based Measure
The futures of gas under a price-based GHG policy is explored using the simple emissions control scenario described in Section 2.4 under which the U.S. reduces its total emissions to 50% below the 2005 level by 2050. It is assumed that other countries take mitigation actions abroad because it seems unlikely that the U.S. would follow through on such a policy unless others participated as well, and actions abroad can affect the U.S. through international trade effects.
The scenario is not designed to represent any specific policy proposal, and no provision is included for offsets. Figure 6 presents the same information for the climate policy case as was presented in Figure   4 for the no-new-policy scenario, adding the gas price at both producer and consumer levels (i.e., including the CO 2 penalty). The broad features of U.S. gas markets under the assumed emissions restriction are not substantially different from the no-policy scenario, at least through 2040. Gas production and use grows somewhat more slowly, reducing use and production by a few Tcf in 2040 compared with the case without climate policy. After 2040, however, domestic production and use begin to fall. The decline is driven by higher gas prices, CO 2 charge inclusive, that gas users would see. The price reaches about $22
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per thousand cubic feet (cf) with well over half of that price reflecting the CO 2 charge. While gas is less CO 2 -intensive than coal or oil, at the reduction level required by 2050 its CO 2 emissions are beginning to represent an emissions problem. Nonetheless, even under the pressure of the assumed emissions policy, total gas use is projected to increase from 2005 to 2050 even for the Low estimate of domestic gas resources.
Energy Quantities and Prices
A major effect of the energy-wide, price-based mitigation is to reduce energy use (Figure 7) .
The effect on the electric sector (Figure 7a ), is to flatten demand. Nuclear, coal or gas with CCS and renewables are relatively expensive compared with gas generation without CO 2 storage.
(Coal and gas with CCS begin to enter the generation mix between 2040 and 2050 but are too small to show in the figure.) Conventional coal is driven from the generation mix by the CO 2 prices needed to meet the economy-wide emissions reduction targets, to be replaced mainly by natural gas. Natural gas is the substantial winner in the electric sector: the substitution effect, mainly gas generation for coal generation, outweighs the demand reduction effect. Because of the estimated abundance of gas and limited opportunities for gas-oil substitution the current price premium in the U.S. of oil products over gas (on an energy basis) is maintained and even grows over time. One substitution option not modeled here is the possibility of conversion of gas to liquids, which might become economic and perhaps be further stimulated by security concerns, even though making no contribution to CO 2 reduction. Such a development would raise U.S. gas use and prices, and lower oil demand with some moderating effect on the world oil price. 
Policy Effects on Gas Use by Sector
The 50% price-based mitigation policy will re-allocate gas use among economic activities. Figure 9 shows the gas use by sector as defined in the EPPA model for the Mean resource case.
(Energy Intensive Industry Products and Other Industry Products are aggregated into a single industry sector.) Transportation includes both commercial transportation and private vehicles; the scenario does not allow for CNG vehicles (explored below) and so they have no effect on gas use. In the No Policy case (Figure 9a ) the greatest increase in gas use is in the industry sector and secondarily in residential use. Under assumed price-based emissions mitigation on the other hand (Figure 9b ), gas use is reduced somewhat especially in the latter years. A prominent feature is the shift of gas to electric generation from other sectors.
The difference in response among sectors represents the combination of a substitution effect (gas against more CO 2 intensive fuels) and an energy use reduction effect because the gas price, inclusive of the CO 2 charge, is higher. In the electricity sector, where gas is an effective substitute for coal, the substitution effect outweighs the demand reduction effect and so gas use increases. Gas use is reduced in other uses where its competition is petroleum fuels or electricity where its carbon advantage is less. While there is a substitution effect, it is weaker and is outweighed by the demand reduction effect caused by higher prices. Energy intensive industries are a focus of particular concern in discussions of greenhouse gas mitigation and the role of natural gas, and projected effects in that sector are summarized in Table 3 . Under the case with no emissions policy gas use in this sector is projected to rise by about 50% by 2050. Under the assumed emissions policy gas use in this sector decreases by about 10% over the simulation period. The total value of output of the sector is reduced as well, by approximately 8%. Imports of energy intensive products are projected to be about the same with and without mitigation, exports from this sector are reduced by 14%. Considering the aggregation of sectors in the EPPA model the absolute values of these effects should not be accorded great weight. But they do suggest the trends to be expected from a pricebased policy: that is, gas will find its greatest economic value in displacing coal in the electric sector, and the higher prices needed to achieve this result will lead to gas being shifted out of other sectors, with the greatest percentage effect expected in trade-exposed sectors, which by the EPPA aggregation points to the industrial sectors in contrast to commercial, service and household users.
Sensitivity to Costs of Competing Technologies
Another influence on the future of natural gas is the costs of competing supplies, particularly in the electric power sector. Here we focus on three technologies to which gas use is particularly sensitive: cheaper renewable sources, lower-cost coal and gas with CCS, and lower-cost nuclear power. Also, we explore the prospect of gas use in household transportation. Because it would be difficult to construct an "equivalent" cost reduction applying to all of these technologies we explore the effect of one scenario of cost reduction for each, to give an impression of how energy markets would adjust and the effect on natural gas.
The results are shown in Table 4 . To explore the effect of cheaper renewables we assume that an elasticity parameter that represents the ease of integrating wind into the grid is increased from 1.0 to 3.0, as shown in Table 2 . This change assumes the variability in the wind resource, and the need to match production with the load, requires less cost than in the base case. Lower-cost renewables yield a reduction in gas use in the electric sector by 1.8 Tcf in 2030, but total gas use falls by only 1.2 Tcf. In 2050 a difference in gas use is smaller, 0.5 Tcf and 0.1 Tcf respectively, as availability of cheaper renewables does not require an increase in nuclear power that by that time starts to replace gas in electric sector.
To explore the effect of cheaper base-load generation the cost of coal and gas generation with CCS is lowered by about 25% (Table 2) . At the higher-cost reference assumptions this technology does not become competitive until too late in the simulation period to have an effect on coal use. With less-costly CCS gas use increases in the electric sector, by nearly 3 Tcf, because both gas and coal generation with CCS become economic and share the low-carbon generation market (with about 25% of electricity produced by gas with CCS by 2050 and another 25% by coal with CCS). Gas use in the economy as a whole increases even more, by 4.2 Tcf.
The biggest impact on gas use in electricity results from the low-cost nuclear generation.
Focusing on 2050, when the effects of alternative assumptions are the largest, a low-cost nuclear assumption reduces annual gas use in the electric sector by nearly 7 Tcf. Economy-wide gas use falls by only about 5 Tcf, however, because the resulting lower demand for gas in electricity leads to a lower price and more use in other sectors of the economy.
Many other combinations of technological uncertainties could be explored, perhaps without adding to the insight to be drawn from these few model experiments: under a price-based mitigation policy natural gas is in a strong competitive position unless competing technologies are much cheaper than we now anticipate. Also, because of its use in almost all sectors, the development of lower-cost competitors in any one sector, such as electric generation, leaves gas at a lower price absorbing at least some of the freed-up supply in other uses. The simulations above do not include the CNG vehicle. This policy case was simulated with this technology included, applying optimistic estimates of the cost penalty of the natural gas vehicle and the pace of development of fueling infrastructure. 5 The result depends on assumptions about the way competing biofuels, and their potential indirect land-use effects, are accounted. 6 Even with advanced biofuels credited as a zero-emissions option, however, CNG vehicles rise to about 15% of the private vehicle fleet by 2040-2050-which is projected to be much more efficient than today. They consume about 1.5 Tcf of gas at that time which, because of the effect of the resulting price increase on other sectors, adds approximately 1.0 Tcf to total national use. 
Effects on U.S. Gas Transport Infrastructure
The changing sources of gas within the U.S. may require changes in the existing transportation infrastructure, either more or different pipelines within the U.S. or more LNG facilities. To explore this prospect we consider the regional shifts in production and consumption within the U.S. employing the USREP model described in Section 2. The USREP model does not resolve bilateral trade flows in the U.S. so we show (Figure 10 ) production, use and net exports or imports in each USREP region for 2006 and 2030 assuming Mean gas resources.
Gas production increases most in those regions with the new shale resources. It increases by more than 150% in the Northeast region (New England through the Great Lake States), by just about 50% in the South Central area that includes Texas, and 30% in the Mountain states. In regions without new shale resource production changes very little-slight increases or decreases.
Under the no-new-policy case ( Figure 10a ) the Northeast production increase comes close to matching the growth in consumption, so this result suggests little need for additional gas transportation infrastructure into this large-demand region (However, we do not model changes in intra-regional flows and investments may be needed to connect new producing areas to existing distribution networks). The biggest gas transportation implications would appear to be additional capacity to move gas from the Texas/South Central region and the Mountain states. 8 National gas production and use with the USREP model differs slightly from the EPPA projections. In the nonew-policy case, gas production and use is slightly higher than in the EPPA simulations, and in the climate policy case it is a bit lower. The USREP model captures inter-regional differences in coal and gas prices and better reflects differences in renewable costs among regions than does the nationally aggregated EPPA model, but it does not explicitly represent foreign trading partners. The variation in results introduced by these differences in structure is well within the range of other uncertainties. 
Effects of a Regulatory Approach to Emissions Mitigation
If The resulting projection of the role of natural gas is shown in Figure 11 . One evident result, in comparison with Figure 7 is that the level of demand reduction in the electric sector is less than under the assumed price-based policy (Figure 11a ). The lower reduction results from the lower electricity price, shown in Figure 8b , which carries no CO 2 charge and only reflects the increased cost of generation imposed by the regulatory requirement. The difference in reduction in the national total (Figure 11b ) is more dramatic compared with Figure 7b because the allsector effect of the universal greenhouse-gas price is missing.
In the electric sector the rapid expansion of renewables tends to squeeze out gas-based generation in the early decades of the period. Of course, as can be seen in the figure, the impact on gas use depends heavily on the relative pace of implementation of the two regulatory measures in this experiment. Regarding total all-sector gas use, this set of assumption leads to a circumstance where gas continues to make a major contribution to national energy use, though potentially less than if all energy sources face the same penalties for their GHG emissions.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL GAS MARKETS
Gas is priced under different conventions in different regions. In some situations prices are set in spot markets; in others they are dominated by contracts linking gas prices to prices of crude oil and oil products. As a result, gas prices can differ substantially among the regions. Here we consider a case where those institutional differences disappear. The main reason that we might expect such a change in market structure is that price differences among regions become so large that profits can be made above the cost of transport. The magnitude of supply from abroad would depend on the development of supply capacity by those nations with very large resources (mainly Russia and countries in the Middle East), or perhaps the expansion of nonconventional sources elsewhere, and as influenced by national and industry policies regarding trade and contract forms. To the extent the structure evolves in this direction, however, there are major implications for U.S. natural gas production and use. To investigate the potential evolution of an integrated global market akin to crude oil, we simulate a case where gas prices are equalized in all markets except for fixed differentials that reflect transport costs. 9 Projected effects on U.S. production and trade are shown in Figure 12 for the 50% pricebased GHG reduction and High, Mean and Low gas resources cases. This result may be compared with the Regional Markets case shown in Figure 6 . Beginning in the period 2020 to 2030, the cost of U.S. gas begins to rise above that of supplies from abroad and the U.S. becomes more dependent on imports of gas. By 2050, the U.S. depends on imports for about 50% of its gas in the Mean resource case. U.S. gas use rises to near the level in the no-policy case because prices are lower. U.S. gas use and prices are much less affected by the level of domestic resources, because the effect on prices is moderated by the availability of imports. The development of an efficient international market, with decisions about supply and imports made on an economic basis, would have complex effects: it would benefit the U.S. economically, limit the development of domestic resources, and lead to growing import dependence. and net exports in each region but there are other flows that are also consistent. Here we show the U.S. to import from the Middle East as well as from Canada and Russia, and movements from the Middle East to Asia and Europe would increase-implying a substantial expansion of LNG facilities. Russian gas would begin to move into Asian markets, via some combination of pipeline transport and LNG.
The precise patterns of trade that might develop to 2030 and beyond will be influenced by the economics of the energy industry, as captured by the EPPA model, and also by national decisions regarding gas production and imports. Therefore, the numbers shown are subject to a number of uncertainties, prominent among which is the willingness of Middle-East and Russian suppliers to produce and export. If potential supplies are not forthcoming then global prices would be higher and the U.S. would import less than projected, or perhaps increase exports.
The broad insight to be drawn from these simulations is nonetheless evident: to the degree that economics is allowed to determine the global gas market, trade in this fuel is likely to increase over coming decades. A few years ago there was significant development of LNG capacity in the U.S. on the expectation that U.S. resources were limited and likely more expensive than international supplies. Had that expectation proved correct, the world might have proceeded faster toward the development of a more broadly integrated global market.
LONGER-TERM PROSPECTS UNDER DEEPER EMISSIONS CUTS
While current investment and policy decisions appropriately focus on a shorter horizon, policy decisions related to atmospheric stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations inevitably involve a very long term perspective. Though gas frequently is touted as a "bridge" to the future, continuing effort is needed to prepare for that future, lest the gift of greater domestic gas resources turn out to be a bridge with no landing point on the far bank.
To illustrate these concerns we extend the simulation period to 2100 and assume that a price- 2050 is a heroic act, and to 2100 even more so, but this scenario provides insight to issues attending the near-term exploitation of the newly-expanded domestic gas resource.
As seen most clearly in the electric sector ( Figure 14) the combination of depletion (riding up the cost curves in Figure 1 ) and the CO 2 price borne by gas, this fuel is priced out of the market for electric generation. Nuclear remains cheaper than coal or gas with CCS for most of the period and so expands to fill the continuing electricity demand. Different cost assumptions well within the range of uncertainty would lead to a different mix of low-CO 2 substitutes, but the picture for gas without CCS would remain the same. One factor that could result in a continuing role for gas would be advances in CCS with natural gas generation. The challenge to this occurring is that gas prices are continuing to rise even with the expanded resource base, and gas generation with CCS would need to compete with coal generation with CCS where the coal price is much lower. This continuing role for gas in generation with CCS would depend on the overall efficiency of gas, the CO 2 capture rate, and any other advantages CCS might have in gas generation over that in coal, and these would need to be substantial enough to compensate for the higher price of gas compared with coal. The general pattern seen in electricity use also appears in the total energy use, although gas holds a position in non-electric uses to the end of the century.
An implication to be drawn from this longer-term experiment is that plentiful supplies of domestic gas in the near term should not detract from preparation for the longer-term emissions challenge. Barriers to the expansion of nuclear power or coal and/or gas generation with CCS must be resolved over the next few decades, so they are capable of expanding to replace natural gas. If facilitating policies are not pursued-by means of RD&D and development of regulatory structures-because of comfort with the gas cushion, then the longer-term sustenance or strengthening of an emissions mitigation regime will not be possible.
A SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The easiest generalization of this exploration of the future of natural gas is that the outlook for gas over the next several decades is highly favorable. Shale gas resources add significantly to the U.S. resource base and allow production to increase whereas in their absence production would likely decline or at best sustain current levels. Naturally the gas resource base and costs of accessing it are uncertain. The upside uncertainty has less of an impact on domestic production levels because at the Mean estimate of resources supply is adequate to meet growing demand at moderate prices through 2050. Even at the pessimistic end of estimates, however, in the absence of additional GHG mitigation U.S. gas production and use is projected to be higher in 2050 than today.
A stringent policy of greenhouse gas reduction, if pursued with a price-based policy that would yield a level playing field for competing energy sources, would favor gas relative to other fossil fuels. The share of gas in total energy use is projected to be larger with such a policy, though overall energy use would be lower. Only under the Low end of the range of domestic resources would gas use in 2050 be lower than today. Regulatory energy policies that might be driven in part by efforts to lower CO 2 emissions could be less favorable for natural gas depending on the relative stringency and timing of the regulations.
With or without GHG emissions mitigation the changing distribution of U.S. gas production, particularly the exploitation of shale resources, will require some expansion in the long-distance pipeline network, primarily to accommodate shipment of gas out of the South Central region to areas other than the North East, though the imposition of emissions mitigation reduces the need such changes in this system.
Gas competes most strongly in the electric power sector, especially under climate policy, because it has much lower CO 2 emissions than coal. The technology is well-known and inexpensive compared with alternatives such as nuclear, CCS or renewables. On a level playing field, only with significant cost breakthroughs or very stringent CO 2 reduction targets would these alternative sources compete effectively with gas over the next few decades. Thus in the electric generation sector natural gas is a bridge fuel under climate policy, providing a cleaner alternative to coal. With continued tightening of CO 2 constraints beyond 2050, however, the CO 2 emissions from gas generation eventually will require adoption of other, still-lower carbon emitting generation technologies. The shale gas resource is far from a panacea over the longer term and investment in the development of still lower CO 2 technologies remains an important priority.
If a more tightly integrated world gas market develops and low cost conventional resources in the Middle East and Russia are accessible to the market, then economic conditions would favor increasing U.S. LNG imports even with large resources of domestic shale. While some of the shale resources can compete with these low cost foreign sources, much of the resource is expected to be more costly to produce and so would not compete purely on economic grounds. 
